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This manuscript was assembled in the course of the 1988-
89 academic year while completing an undergraduate research 
fellowship under the mentorship of Dr. Paul Hamori. In examining 
the dialectical materialism of V.I. Lenin, as expounded in 
1'1"'! terialism an<:L Empi ŲÙŌĤŸŲÙĚWÙŸĦGĤJÙĹŊËËHĚ an attempt was made to 
provide the reader with a brief, yet thorough synopsis of the 
main arguments of the work so as to present Lenin's philosophy 
with greater clarity and brevity than was the case in the 
original work. While Lenin's impact upon the world has been 
tremendous, and his ideas once commanded an immense following, 
many of the works in which he expressed his ideas were written 
with a specific audience in mind and dealt with issues and 
controversies which were peculiar to his age. In addition, it 
is probably fair to say that Lenin's skills as a political 
agitator were superior to his skills as a writer. Consequently, 
the project which culminated in the completion of this manuscript 
posed a number of challenges. 
In ÓŠWŸĦÒĴÙŚŠŨÙŸĤGŊÒŸŪKĴÒŸĤGËËËŮÚÒÚĦŚÕĤŚŇŅÙĚt icism, Lenin's 
presentation of his theses ranges from obscure to redundant, 
and the contemporary reader is often hard pressed to understand 
subtle references which were undoubtedly common knowledge 1n 
the circle of Russian emigres in which Lenin moved in the early 
1900's, but which can be difficult to make sense of out of 
historical context. In addition, Lenin's treatment of the 
problems of philosophy is loaded with political relevance. 
Indeed, it may be said that ŸŸŊHŤŲÚĦŸŨÚĦVÜŚŸĚ. ĦŪĜÒĦNÜŌÙŲÙŬĤŚŸĿĦÙJWÙȘÙVÜĦĚ
represents not as much a treatise on philosophy as a manifesto of 
what its author believed Marxist philosophy should be. 
-Consequently. a greater emphasis was placed on discovering the 
political motives underlying Lenin's philosophical convictions 
than on a mere reporting of those convictions as put forward 
in the work. 
Despite these difficulties, it is believed that the final 
work represents a satisfying summary treatment of the material 
which will greatly aid not only in the understanding of 
Lenin's conception of dialectical materialism. but also of his 
political convictions. as well as something of his character. 
MLA style was adhered to in the preparation of the 
manuscript. All quotations are from ÓŠWŤŲJÙŠŅÒŸŊËÒŠŪTŚŸŨËËŌÙŲÙŬĶ­
ŇŲÚHWÚȘŸŚÒŸÜĚand are therefore ci ted by page number only. Items 
enclosed in quotation marks within the text are generally uncited 
since they are presented either in an effort to convey the flavor 
of Lenin's prose or to provide examples of terminologies which 
were central to the debate and recur throughout the text. All 
italics in indented text are Lenin's. 
It should be clearly noted that this work represents a 
collaborative effort. Dr. Hamori's involvement in this project 
was both continual and enthusiastic. His insistence on excellence 
and his guidance through ceaseless revisions greatly contributed 
to the quality of the final product. In retrospect. I view my 
experience in working with Dr. Hamori as having been both a 
priveledge and a pleasure and am glad to have had the opportunity 
to participate in the undergraduate research fellowship program. 
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Vladmi r Leni n wrote ÓŸWŤȘŸJÙŚĿËŨÙVÜŚŸŸŪŸŸŸȚȚÙŌÙĚŲĪÌŚĤJĤĿWGÙWÙŇÙŸÜĚ
as a response to those philosophical "revisionists" within the 
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party who -- influenced by the 
work of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenerius -- attempted to 
substitute idealist principles for the traditional materialism 
of Marx, as developed by Engels and Plekhanov. Such attempts 
infuriated Lenin because he considered them a betrayal of 
classical Marxism and an abandonment of dialectical 
materialism. 
The empirio-criticists (whom Lenin referred to as 
"Machians" throughout the text) sought to reconcile the 
contradiction between materialism and idealism by combining 
the two philosophies into a single body of thought. In so 
doing, they called into question the sanctity of established 
Marxist doctrine on such fundamental problems as the accuracy 
of sense perception, the existence of matter. and the nature 
of truth. The empirio-criticists also claimed that their 
system of thought was consistent with "recent" philosophical 
developments., a claim whose truth Lenin vehemently contested. 
On the whole, it might be said that the empirio-criticists 
attempted to synthesize materialism and idealism into a new 
system which would transcend all previous philosophy. 
The empirio-criticists claimed that their work was 
characterized by an ability to apply new modes of thought and 
new approaches to problems in an effort to improve upon 
Marxism from within. They sought to surpass and update the 
traditional orthodoxy of Engels and Plekhanov by drawing on 
--
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then current epistemological developments. Lenin strongly 
objected to this approach and branded it a deviation from 
Ma rxi sm. In wri ti ng ÓŸWNĹŲÙŸŚŊJÙHĹŲŪŚŸMĜJJÒȚJŚÜŌŚWŲÙŬJĤĿËJÙWÙȘÙĚsill, it was 
Lenin's intHntion to express his unmitigated opposition to 
this new trend. to expose it as an idealist aberration from 
true Marxism. and to curb its influence within the party. 
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Both the materialists and the empirio-criticists 
identified sensation as the fundamental source of all human 
knowledge. The assertion that one knows the world only through 
his sensations was accepted by both Lenin and his philosophical 
opponents as a basic truth. Beneath this concurrence, however. 
there was a sharp disagreement concerning the ultimate source and 
essential nature of sensation as it applies to the sphere of 
perception. Lenin considered this problem a crucial one as it 
involved the larger issue of the primacy of matter over mind, an 
issue which Lenin regarded as the core of classical Marxist 
philosophy. 
In the development of their philosophy. the empirio-
criticists sought to eliminate the traditional distinction 
between the concept of matter and that of ideas. In order to 
avoid being labeled either materialists or idealists, they 
devised new categories and new terminologies through which to 
express their thought. In accord with this, they used the term 
"element" -- a concept which they felt tanscended philosophical 
one-sidedeness -- to describe what they believed to be the 
principal component of reality. The empirio-criticists considered 
sensation to be a more accurate measure of reality than matter 
and argued that what appear as physical realities are actually 
composed of "complexes of sensations." The objects of perception. 
they claimed, are actually specific arrangements of sensation 
which appear to the subject as physical entities. In short, the 
empirio-criticists regarded the materialist assumption of an 
independently existing physical reality as a naive self 
8 
deception. 
Lenin rejected the philosophy of the empirio-
criticists as a trivial embellishment of antiquated idealist 
and solipsist thinking which wavered indecisively between 
materialism and idealism. In his opinion. the introduction of 
new terminologies only served to further confuse an already 
muddled and inconsistent system of thought. He also alleged 
that the empirio-criticists had misinterpreted the role of 
sensation and had ignored the importance of the interaction of 
material entities in the sphere of cognition. 
Lenin regarded perception as a purely physiological 
process which occurs as a result of the action of physical 
stimuli on the sense organs of the subject. Leaning on Engels' 
Anti-Duhring, he asserted that sensation represents a 
reflection of external reality in the mind of the subject. In 
Lenin's ẂÙŤŸŨĦĚ sensations are perceived as images of external 
material entities and do not exist as entities in themselves. 
Having defined sensation as an image or reflection of external 
reality. he maintained that sensation could not exist without 
an a priori reality and concluded that sensation is a 
secondary phenomenon which derives its existence from some 
particular embodiment of matter. 
Lenin claimed that the materialist theory of 
perception presented an accurate model of reality and provided 
a true knowledge of the world. In contrast, he added, empirio-
criticism constituted an obstacle to our knowledge of the 
world as it really is because of its claim that through 
sensory observations one could never be certain as to whether a 
material entity actually existed or not. Lenin censured the 
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empirio-criticists for questioning the reliability of sense 
perception and considered their mistrust of sensory experience 
a fundamental weakness of their philosophy. Lenin viewed 
sensation as a medium which serves to link the human 
consciousness to exteral reality. He further claimed that the 
materialist theory of perception had been confirmed by 19th 
century discoveries in natural science and that it conformed 
to the common sense conception of the world. 
For every scientist who has not been led astray by 
professorial philosophy. as well as for every 
materialist. sensation is indeed the direct connection 
between consciousness and the external world; it is 
the transformation of the energy of external 
excitation into a state of consciousness. This 
transformation has been, and is, observed by each of 
us a million times on every hand (sic). The sophism of 
idealist philosophy consists in the fact that it 
regards sensation as being not the connection between 
consciousness and the external world, but as a fence. 
a wall, separating consciousness from the external 
world -- not as an image of the external phenomenon 
corr'esponding to the sensation, but as the "sole 
E:'lnti ty (44)." 
Lenin cited the perception of color as an example of 
the interaction of material entities which he considered 
essential to the cognitive process. He noted that color is 
perceived as a result of the action of light waves on the 
retina. In his thinking, this served as proof that an external 
material reality (light) acts upon a sense organ (the retina) 
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to transmit a sensation (color) to the brain. In this 
analysis, Lenin clearly regarded light as matter. Dialectical 
materialist philosophy. as expounded by Lenin. regarded all 
external realities as material by definition and disputed the 
notion of objectively existing nonmaterial realities. In 
accord with this, he identified light waves as material 
realities by virtue of their existence independently of the 
perceiving subject. This postulate, which would seem to 
contradict the common sense view of matter, was based on an 
exclusivelY epistemological definition of matter and 
represents a primary principle of Lenin's dialectical 
materialism as well as a key to the understanding of his 
conception of reality_ 
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Matter Clnd ĿJŬŨÍVȘÙŌŨŊĹŨGĞŸVVĚ
Lenin characterized the empirio-criticists' conception 
of matter as an idealist departure from the fundamental 
materialist principles of Marxism. According to Lenin, the 
empirio-criticists had defined matter as an "abstract symbol" 
whose only significance was to denote the existence of stable 
groupings of sensations. In his opinion, this interpretation 
reduced itself to a denial of the existence of external 
reality in general and of any objective material reality in 
particular. The empirio-criticists, he argued, subscribed to 
an idealist interpretation of matter in that they identified 
matter as a conception originating in human consciousness 
rather than as an objective entity which exists independently 
of, and prior to, one's perception of it. In their explanation 
of matter as a by-product of human consciousness, Lenin 
continued. the empirio-criticists had rejected the primacy of 
matter over mind and had begun "rolling down an inclined 
plane (170)" into the bottomless pit of idealist philosophy. 
Lenin regarded the primacy of matter as the 
fundamental assertion of dialectical materialism to which all 
other questions of philosophy were subordinate. The empirio-
criticists, he charged, had denied this basic truth and had 
instead placed the cart before the horse by deriving the 
existence of matter from that of consciousness rather than 
vice versa. For Lenin, consciousness was a property of highly 
developed organic matter which enabled human beings (and other 
living things) to sense the nature of their surroundings and 
respond to their environment in an appropriate manner. 
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Consciousness was. in Lenin's view. matter endowed with 
sensation. 
Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, 
takes matter as primary and regards consciousness, 
thought and sensation as secondary because in its 
well-defined form sensation is associated only with 
the higher forms of matter (organic matter) ... (38). 
Lenin's explanation of consciousness as a property of 
matter was coupled with his admission that neither materialist 
philosophy nor natural science had determined why 
consciousness manifests itself in some material entities (i.e. 
living organisms) and (presumibly) not in others (inanimate 
objects). Lenin maintained that although dialectical 
materialism had not yet provided an answer to the question as 
to why only certain arrangements of matter aquire 
consciousness, this philosophy was consistent with the 
scientific approach necessary to do so eventually. 
There still remains to be investigated and 
reinvestigated how matter, apparently entirely devoid 
of sensation, is related to matter which, though 
composed of the same atoms (or electrons), is yet 
ŸĨŪTŬŴŤTĚwith a well-defined faculty of sensation. 
Materialism clearly formulates the (sic) as yet 
unsolved problem and thereby stimulates the attempt to 
solve it, to undertake further experimental 
investigation (39). 
-. 
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The empirio-criticists considered the materialist 
interpretation of reality an obsolete doctrine whose 
fundamental views had been rendered untenable by the advance 
of science and philosophy. In their thinking. the findings of 
post-Newtonian physics had clearly demonstrated the inadequacy 
of traditional Marxist philosophy and necessitated a more 
flexible approach to the problems of philosophy than was 
characteristic of the work of Marx. Engels, and Plekhanov. 
The empirio-criticists charged that materialist 
philosophy had been unable to develop a working definition of 
matter. Although all materialists held a consensus that the 
objects of perception are composed of substantive physical 
"stuff," none had been able to offer a concrete definition of 
matter which could stand the test of science. They further 
contended that the traditional Marxist view concerning the 
primacy of matter represented little more than a repitition of 
a vague formula by which the materialists evaded the crucial 
issue: what is the nature of matter? 
The empirio-criticists seem to have believed that all 
materialist philosophy rested on the assumption of the 
existence of a finite physical "building block" of which all 
realities are composed and beyond which no reality could be 
further reduced in scope. According to the empirio-criticists. 
the discovery of sub-atomic particles had invalidated this 
fundamental assumption of materialism and represented a 
corroboration of their own system of thought. They further 
claimed that the traditional notion of matter had lost all 
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significancE! in modern thought and echoed the cr"y of a number 
of prominent physicists that matter, as science used to 
envision it, had "disappeared." 
Lenin accused the empirio-criticists of confusing the 
issue and argued that they (along with a number of prominent 
physicists) had arrived at idealist conclusions from recent 
discoveries in science due only to their ignorance of the 
actual tenents of dialectical materialism. He further alleged 
that the empirio-criticists had failed to understand the 
distinction between "metaphysical" and dialectical materialism 
and that they had confused the Marxist conception of matter 
with that of Vogt, Bachner. and others. According to Lenin, 
the empirio-criticists had disputed the views of dialectical 
materialism on the basis of a profound misunderstanding of the 
doctrine. 
Lenin asserted that the empirio-criticists would have 
been justified in their criticism of non-dialectical 
materialism had they conducted their inquiry from a 
dialectical materialist rather than from an idealist vantage 
point. Lenin pointed out. however, that the empirio-criticists 
had rejected dialectical materialism -- which they never 
understood -- on the basis of the shortcomings of pre-Marxian 
materialism, and that they had wrongly attributed those 
deficiencies to dialectical materialism. Lenin himself 
denounced pre-Marxian materialism as "metaphysical" on the 
grounds that it regarded matter as a static entity and 
neglected to take into account its dynamic character. Whereas 
metaphysical materialism expressed a belief in the "immutable 
essence" of matter and argued that there are fixed physical 
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boundaries in nature, dialectical materialism perceived matter 
as a category which encompasses the complex collection of 
constantly developing external realities which precede the 
mind and are reflected in it_ 
Matter is a philosophical category designating the 
objective reality which is given to man by his 
sensations, and which is copied, photographed and 
reflected by our sensations, while existing 
independently of them (128). 
Lenin held that dialectical materialism was consistent 
with the findings of modern physics and further claimed that 
this doctrine constituted the "only" authentic context for the 
interpretation of those findings. He argued that the 
discoveries cited by the empirio-criticists in their 
refutation of materialism actually served to prove what the 
dialectical materialists had been saying all along: matter is 
a dynamic mode of being which is infinitely complex and 
developes unceasingly and independently of our awareness of 
it. Lenin insisted that the discovery of sub-atomic particles 
had in no way invalidated the Marxian conception of matter, 
which he equated with the recognition of objective reality_ In 
his view, the question of the ultimate composition of matter, 
while not unimportant, was irrelevant to the question as to 
whether or not matter exists. 
Materialism and idealism differ in their respective 
answers to the question of the source of our knowledge 
and of the relation of knowledge (and of the "psychical" 
in general) to the physical world; while the question 
of the structure of matter, of atoms and electrons, is a 
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question that concerns only this physical world (266). 
Lenin believed that the ultimate question of 
philosophy. put forward by Engels in Anti-Duhring and 
elsewhere, was that of the relation of thinking to being. In 
his view, no problem of philosophy could be addressed without 
considering the issue of primacy. Lenin charged that the 
empirio-criticists were attempting to reverse the Marxist 
stand on this crucial question by arguing that consciousness 
is prior to matter, rather than vice versa. Lenin regarded the 
primacy of matter as the central tenant of Marxist philosophy 
and he censured the empirio-criticists for rejecting this 
principle. 
Lenin claimed that the Marxian conception of reality, 
which revolved around the recognition of the primacy of 
matter. contained within itself the most complete definition 
of matter necessary to correctly understand the relationship 
between material entities and the phenomenal world. He argued 
that the only characteristic of matter with which Marxian 
philosophy concerned itself was that of being an objective 
reality which exists prior to consciousness_ The empirio-
criticists. Lenin claimed. had rejected the primacy of matter 
(and thus the existence of matter independently of mind) and 
had therefore dismissed the existence of objective reality as 
a whole. 
In Lenin's opinion, to acknowledge the existence of 
any objective reality was to admit the existence of matter 
and, conversely. to reject the existence of matter was 
tantamount to denying the existence of any objective reality. 
It may be said that Lenin regarded all idealist philosophy 
(including empirio-criticism) as solipsism. Lenin rejected 
ŸĚ objective idealism as a gross contradiction in terms and 
vindicated that only an unrelenting materialist philosophy 
could offer a realistic view of the world and guard against 
the absurdity of solipsism. 
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Although Lenin denied that the Marxian conception of 
matter implied a belief in a substantive, physical substratum 
common to all material entities, many of his arguments 
implied such a belief (i.e. his assertion that thought 
cannot exist without brain). Whatever the case, Lenin's 
epistemological definition of matter gives rise to some 
interesting problems. 
In essence, Lenin's epistemological materialism 
confers materiality upon a given entity by virtue of its 
relationship to a perceiving individual, who is also regarded 
as a material entity. In other words, material entities are 
defined as those things which are external to other material 
entities. Given Lenin's insistence that all things which exist 
are material, the distinction between the perceiving subject 
and the external object which is the basis for his definition 
of matter would appear to be little more than a false 
dichotomy between entities which are essentially identical, 
which may be precisely what the empirio-criticists were 
suggesting with their philosophy_ 
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Matter and Motion 
Lenin's critique of metaphysical materialism 
centered around his contention that the classical materialists 
had wrongly regarded matter as an immutable constant which 
exists in a fixed state. Lenin rejected this view and argued 
that the recognition of the dynamic character of matter was 
essential to the Marxian conception of materialism and 
represented the only scientific view of the world. In contrast 
to this, he claimed, the empirio-criticists and a number of 
contemporary physicists. particularly William Ostwald, had been 
led astray by their own ignorance of dialectical materialism 
and had fallen victim to an idealist interpretation of reality. 
In his energeticist theory. Ostwald attempted to reduce 
the ultimate measure of reality to the sphere of energy rather 
than to that of either matter or consciousness. In Lenin's view, 
Ostwald's energeticist theory represented an attempt to divorce 
motion from matter and place it on the pinnacle of primacy. Such 
an attempt, he argued, actually served to throw the door wide 
open for idealism in physics, which Lenin regarded as an 
inherently materialist discipline. 
Lenin insisted that neither matter nor motion could exist 
independently of the other, but rather formed a unitary whole. 
t.enin maintained that all motion is dependent on the existence of 
distinct material entities and contended that matter develops 
infinitely and is, therefore, in constant motion. For Lenin, the 
concept of primacy was not an issue in the question of the 
relationship of matter to motion due to the fact that he regarded 
these modes as being coexistent. 
--
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The metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectical, materialist 
may accept the existence of matter without motion (even 
though temporarily. before "the fir'st impulse," etc.). 
The dialectical materialist not only regards motion as 
an inseparable property of matter. but rejects the 
simplified view of motion and so forth .... Whether we say 
the world is moving matter. or that it is material 
motion. makes no difference whatever (277-278). 
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The ØUÙŪŦĤŅŪĤŅWVŸŨȚĚ
In the opinion of the empirio-criticists, the concept of 
the thing-in-itself -- a Kantian notion -- had found expression 
in materialist philosophy largely through the work of George 
Plekhanov. Lenin dismissed this assertion and argued that the 
notion of things-in-themselves had been the subject of 
philosophical debate even before it was developed into a specific 
concept by Kant. 
Lenin diagnosed the dispute concerning the validity of the 
thing-in-itself as an outward expression of the fundamental 
division of philosophy into two warring camps -- materialism and 
idealism. This assertion is typical of Lenin's customary approach 
to the problems of philosophy and represents one of the principal 
themes of Material ism and Empi ŔËŌĤJJĿĶJŲÙWĦJÒȘÙŸŊŨŨĦĚ
In his treatment of such issues as the thing-in-itself, 
Lenin evaluated the concept almost exclusively in terms of its 
role in the struggle between materialism and idealism rather than 
on its abstract merit. In order for a philosophical observation 
to gain favor in his thinking, it first had to conform to 
standard norms and patterns of interpretation within the Marxian 
tradition. The crucial issue for Lenin, as it had been for 
Engels, was whether materialism or idealism would dominate man's 
thought and guide his actions. In his view, no philosopher could 
remain impartial in this matter. Lenin advocated a strictly 
materialist approach and characterized any attempt to reconcile 
materialism and idealism -- or develop a third school of 
philosophy -- as a lapse into reactionary thinking_ 
In line with this. Lenin interpreted the struggle between 
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dialectical materialism and philosophical idealism as an 
extension of the class struggle into the realm of consciousness. 
When viewed in this light. the dispute between the materialists 
and the empirio-criticists becomes a struggle between the 
progressive thinkers of the proletariat and the reactionary 
spokesmen of the bourgeoisie. Although Lenin undoubtedly thought 
along these lines, it should be noted that the empirio-critical 
school was attempting to make progress in philosophy whereas 
Lenin was anxious to uphold and corroborate the teachings of 
Marx, Engels, and (to a lesser extent), Plekhanov as the last 
word on the subject. 
According to Lenin. the empirio-criticists had actually 
introduced no new arguments in their refutation of the thing-in-
itself but had rather plaigiarized the work of various classical 
idealist philosophers, especially Bishop George Berkeley. In 
light of this. Lenin charged that empirio-criticism represented 
not a forward leap in philosophy. but rather a step backward into 
idealist and religious thinking. In his view. the empirio-
criticists had chosen to ignore the "real" progress made in 
philosophy by Marx and Engels and had, as a result, become 
ensnared in the antiquated myths of classical idealism, as 
represented in the philosophy of Mach and Avenerius. 
The empirio-criticists. Lenin maintained, viewed the 
thing-in-itself as a mysterious metaphysical construction which. 
contrary to their conception of philosophical monism, served as 
the basis of an epistemological dualism by dividing the world 
into two seperate spheres. 
Lenin actually overreacted on this particular issue. The 
empirio-criticists merely suggested that the concept of the 
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thing-in-itself represented a transgression of the bounds of 
experience. For them. the notion of things existing independently 
of perception implied that all human knowledge is inaccurate and 
incomplete as it is based on a distorted vision of a reality 
which is beyond the senses and therefore unknowable. Such a view. 
they argued, disrupted the unity of the world and rendered all 
human knowledge meaningless. 
The empirio-criticists also pointed out that no matter 
how intuitively satisfying it is to accept the notion of the 
preexistence of things-in-themselves after their discovery, this 
common sense assumption with respect to newly encountered 
realities actually constit!Jtes an act of faith. To assume that a 
newly experienced entity existed prior to the experience requires 
one to confer a permanent identity upon something which can only 
be verified in its immediate manifestation to consciousness. In 
other words, the existence of a reality cannot be established 
prior to our conscious awareness of it. Lenin acknowledged this 
criticism. but did not attempt to refute it in his treatment of 
the thing-in-itself. It is interesting to note that the empirio-
criticists convincingly implicated the materialist school in the 
very crime with which Lenin so vehemently accused them; the crime 
of granting concessions to articles of faith in their philosophy. 
In denying the existence of things-in-themselves, Lenin 
claimed. the empirio-criticists had misunderstood the basic issue 
at hand: the irreconcilable struggle between materialism. which 
recognizes the existence of things outside the sphere of 
perception, 3nd idealism. which bases its view of reality on the 
act of perception and admits the existence of nothing 
independently of it. According to Lenin, things-in-themselves 
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abound in the world and playa key role in the philosophy of 
dialectical materialism. Following Engels, Lenin described the 
thing-in-itself as an entity which is unknown rather than 
unknowable jn a permanent sense. When a new element or property 
of matter is discovered. he argued, it is transformed in status 
from a thing-in-itself into a thing-for-us. The newly discovered 
element. having existed in the same manner prior to its discovery 
as after, serves as proof (in Lenin's view) that things-in-
themselves exist and are comprehensible. The development of human 
knowledge is seen as a process through which things-in-themselves 
become things-for-us as a result of scientific investigation. 
Lenin stressed this point with reference to the dialectical mode 
of r'easoni ng. 
In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of 
science, we must think dialectically, that is, we most 
not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unalterable, 
but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance. 
how insufficient, inexact knowledge becomes more complete 
and more exact (99). 
Lenin closed his argument with the assertion that the 
fundamental truth questioned by the empirio-criticists in their 
denial of the thing-in-itself was that of the immutable existence 
of objective reality. Dialectical materialism, he argued, 
recognizes the existence of things-in-themselves, things which 
exist outside of perception, as a basic pillar of its world view. 
He flJrther alleged that the empirio-criticists. by rejecting this 
concept, had rendered their philosophy incompatible with the 
materialism of Marx, and had consequently strayed into the camp 
of idealism. 
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ØUŸĚNature of TrMth 
The empirio-criticists, particularly Alexander Bogdanov 
(a sometime Bolshevik). rejected the existence of absolute truths 
and argued that all truth must be viewed as a product of the 
historical epoch in which it arises. They viewed truth as a form 
of human understanding and maintained that, as such, all truth is 
subject to the limitations imposed upon human consciousness 
within a given historical period. In line with this. the empirio-
criticists denied that any truth could be valid for all time and 
argued that the category of eternal truth was incompatible with 
the dynamic nature of the Marxian world view. 
The empirio-criticists regarded collective experience as 
the most reliable criterion of truth and believed that all truths 
are actually derived from the observed correspondance of various 
individual perceptions of the world. For the empirio-criticists, 
any truth represented a SUbjective interpretation of a reality 
llndergoing constant change and was therefore relative under all 
circumstances. The empirio-criticists believed that their 
interpretation of truth was consistent with the Marxian mode of 
reasoning and held that their conception of truth had remained 
faithful to the spirit, if not the letter, of classical Marxism. 
Lenin responded to these claims by asserting that the 
empirio-criticist theory of truth was based on a profound 
misunderstanding of the dialectical method. He charged that 
empirio-criticism contradicted the teachings of Engels and that 
it represented a fundamental deviation from the Marxian 
tradition. Lenin further criticized the empirio-criticist theory 
of truth on the ground that it implied a denial of the objective 
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existence of the world and rendered all truth dependent on the 
mind, thus constituting an abandonment of objective criteria in 
the theory of knowledge. 
Just as there exists an absolute external reality, Lenin 
contended, so there exist truths corresponding to that reality 
which are themselves absolute and immutable. Although man's 
ability to understand reality and ascertain truths from it is 
relative to historical circumstances, there are truths which 
accurately reflect the objective nature of reality and are 
therefore valid regardless of the disposition of consciousness. 
For Lenin. accurate knowledge of the world unfolds through a 
process in which past truths -- themselves developed within the 
confines of historically conditioned human understanding --
gradually approximate absolute. eternal truths as human knowledge 
progresses toward a more accurate understanding of the objective 
world with the advance of the sciences. 
Human thought is then by its nature capable of giving, 
and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a 
sum total of relative truths. Each step in the 
development of science adds new grains to the sum of 
absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each 
scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now 
shrinking with the growth of knowledge (133-134). 
Lenin charged that the empirio-criticists had treated the 
problem of truth in a purely speCUlative manner and had failed to 
substantiate their theory of truth by testing it in real life 
situations. Lenin regarded practice as the Ultimate measure of 
truth and, in the manner" of Anti-Duhring, he r"easoned that the 
validity of a truth could be demonstrated only by showing that it 
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enabled man to effect changes in his environment. For Lenin, a 
theory which could not be demonstrated in practice was as futile 
as practice devoid of theoretical considerations_ 
In Lenin's thinking, Marxist philosophy represented a 
guide to action as well as a key to understanding the world. He 
held, as had Marx in his "Theses on Feuerbach," that the goal of 
philosophy was to change the world rather than merely to 
interpret it. lenin regarded Marxist doctrine as the highest 
expression of truth and dismissed any other approach to the 
problems of philosophy as unjustified and unworkable. lenin 
charged that the empirio-criticists, in their vain attempt to 
update classical Marxist philosophy with the teachings of Mach 
and Avenerius, had actually wrought considerable harm to the 
doctrine. By basing their theory of truth on subjective 
principles. he continued, the empirio-criticists had not only 
abandoned the objective truth of Marxism, but had also reduced 
their philosophy to the level of idle speculation and religious 
superstition. 
According to lenin, the empirio-criticist theory of truth 
implied that knowledge could be obtained through faith. lenin 
criticized Bogdanov's conception of truth as a concession to 
superstitious thinking and argued that his definition of truth as 
a product of "collective experience" gr-anted legi timacy to 
religious beliefs regardless of their objective validity. which 
he considered nill. Lenin charged that the empirio-criticist 
theory of truth undermined the uncompromising atheism of 
traditional Marxism by leaving loopholes for fideist and 
religious beliefs. Although the majority of the empirio-
criticists (including Bogdanov) were avowed atheists, their 
.-
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Time and $(:>ctce 
The empirio-criticists regarded space and time as 
sUbjective categories through which human beings seek to 
comprehend the world. They explained the conceptions of space and 
time as manifestations of human consciousness and argued that 
these notions contained no permanent significance outside the 
sphere of cognition. Space and time were, for the empirio-
criticists, a framework of human understanding rather than an 
accurate portrayal of reality. 
Lenin dismissed this view as an absurd idealist 
misconception of reality which contradicted the common sense 
interpretation of the world as well as the teachings of science 
(as he saw them). In his opinion, the empirio-criticists had 
placed undue emphasis on the principle of relativism in their 
theory of knowledge and had failed to understand the distinction 
between permanently existing objective realities and the 
subjective measure of those realities through which human beings 
may gradually increase their knowledge of the world. According to 
Lenin, the recognition of space and time as immutable conditions 
of being rather than as relative forms of understanding -- is 
critical to the materialist theory of knowledge and represents 
the only authentic view of reality. 
Recognising (sic) the existence of objective reality, 
i.e .• matter in motion independently of our mind (sic). 
materialism must also inevitably recognise (sic) the 
objective reality of time and space ... Just as things or 
bodies are not mere phenomena, not complexes of 
sensations. but objectively real forms of being. There 1S 
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nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter in 
motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time (176-
177). 
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Hieroglyph Versus Reflection Theory 
1 hr'oughout Matexi,ali.sm and WĴŨØŨŮÙĦŲWŌJĤĤĿJJŲÙWĴÚȘJÒŸÜĚ Lenin 
defended George Plekhanov's interpretation of materialist 
philosophy (which he considered very close to his own) from 
the attacks of the empirio-criticists. This may be partly due 
to the fact that Lenin began his study of Marxism as a student 
of Plekhanov. Despite Lenin's admiration for Plekhanov, and 
despite the similiarity of their philosophies, he was quick 
to point out significant doctrinal differences which existed 
between them. 
Lenin complained that Plekhanov dealt with the 
challengers of Marxism on a purely theoretical level while 
ignoring the idealist origins and practical consequences of 
such revisionist tendencies as empirio-criticism. In contrast to 
this approach, Lenin attacked empirio-criticism not only for its 
theoretical, but also for its class content. In addition, Lenin 
differed with Plekhanov in his understanding of perception and 
strong] y objected to his "hieroglyph" theory of pet"ception, 
which conflicted with his own. 
Plekhanov contended that sensation represents a 
charicature. or hieroglyph. of external reality and that one s 
impression of the world is actually a symbol -- much like a 
shadow -- of the reality which produces it rather than its 
exact copy. According to Lenin this postulate implied, in the 
spirit of epistemological agnosticism, that one can never 
comprehend the true nature of reality. For Lenin, such a 
postulate entailed that human knowledge can never discern the 
objective validity of any observation of the world and is. 
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therefore, inherently distorted and misleading. 
In contrast to Plekhanov. Lenin regarded sensation as 
a ment.al "photograph" which conveys an accurate picture of 
external reality. Tn his opinion, t.he act. of perception 
involves a copying process by which ext.ernal reality is 
reflected in the human mind through t.he medium of sensation. 
according to Lenin, the copy theory of perception safeguarded 
materialist philosophy from agnost.ic conclusions and 
represent.ed the only accurate interpretation of the views of 
Marx and Engels. 
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NÜŮÙŲÙŬĤĿŲÙWÙȘÙŸÜĚŸŪTĚSolipsism 
The empirio-criticists regarded their system of 
thought as a revolutionary synthesis of materialism and 
idealism which provided a more balanced interpretation of the 
world than had previous philosophies of either idealist or 
materialist persuasion. The empirio-criticists believed that 
their approach to the problems of philosophy was unique and 
unprecedented and argued that their philosophy had transcended 
the traditional one-sided view of reality expounded by 
classical thinkers. Lenin rejected this view and charged that 
empirio-criticism was still based primarily on idealist 
premises which. when extended to their logical conclusions, 
produced a solipsist world view. 
By basing their view of reality on sensation, Lenin 
claimed. the empirio-criticists had relinquished the only 
scientific (or. more precisely, materialist) approach to the 
problems of philosophy and had succumbed to the pitfalls of 
subjective idealism, particularly solipsism. According to 
Lenin, if the empirio-criticist interpretation of external 
realities were consistently applied to all experienced 
realities, then all people other than the self would be 
reduced to the status of sensations subordinate to the 
cognitive processes of a single subject. If all the objects of 
perception are in fact composed of sensation, he continued, 
then the existence of multiple subjects could not be 
confirmed. Tn Lenin's opinion, empirio-criticism offered no 
means by which to substantiate the existence of anyone other 
than the philosophizing individual. Implicit in the empirio-
criticist view of reality. he charged, was the solipsist 
postulate that the entire world is one's own sensation. 
Clearly. Lenin considered the emphasis of the empirio-
criticists on the subjective measure of reality a concession 
to solipsism in their theory of knowledge. Although Lenin 
dismissed solipsism as an absurd notion. he conceded that when 
applied consistently the doctrine contained a great deal of 
validity_ For- examp)e, if sensation is identified as the 
ultimate source of all human knowledge, it follows that one's 
view of the world is a private reality based solely on 
individual perception. Consequently. a reality exists only 
when it is directly experienced. In short, every person who 
has one for another is another for one. and no one may 
experience another as subject or encounter himself as object. 
Notwithstanding this acknowledgement, Lenin strongly objected 
to the empirio-criticist explanation of reality. which he 
regarded as a confused rehash of subjective idealism. 
The empirio-criticists, Lenin contended, had denied 
the existence of external material realities and had elevated 
sensation to the role of primacy in their system of thought. 
In so doing. he continued, they had also rejected the 
existence of the brain independently of sensation, thereby 
implying the existence of thought without brain and expressing 
a view of reality virtually identical to that of subjective 
idealism. 
Lenin's attempt to equate empirio-criticism with 
solipsism actally involved a willful distortion of the 
empirio-criticists' views on his part. The empirio-criticists 
had. in fact, allowed for the existence of the brain and 
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nervous system and had explicitly rejected the solipsist 
outlook in their philosophy_ Although Lenin acknowledged that 
the empirio-criticists had actually incorporated some 
materialist postulates into their system, he argued that they 
had done so in contradiction to their own basic assumptions 
about the nature of the world. In his opinion. the materialist 
aspects of empirio-criticism were irrelevant to the underlying 
essence of this philosophy and those few materialist premises 
in no way altered the idealist nature of the system as a 
whole. 
Lenin's analysis of empirio-criticism as latent 
solipsism was founded on his evaluation of this philosophy in 
terms of what he believed to be its implicit meaning. As a 
result. Lenin's interpretation of empirio-criticism was 
essentially a solipsist one and did not correspond with the 
pronouncements of the empirio-criticists themselves. 
.. -
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Empirio-Criticism and Religion 
Anatoly lunacharsky, although not himself an empirio-
criticist, collaborated with many prominent theorists of this 
school in the publication of a collective philosophical work 
entitled Studies in the Philosophy of ÓŸŲẄÙVÜĦĚ Lenin's 
Materialism ŸŪTĚEmpido-Criticism was actually writ.ten as a 
refutation of this work. Lunacharsky's involvement with the 
empirio-criticists stemmed more from a common search for a new 
approach to the study of Marxist philosophy rather than from a 
shared philosophical consensus. Lenin noted that. In the 
introduction to Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism 
Lunacharsky had expressed the spirit of this approach in stating: 
"Perhaps we have gone astray, but we are seeking (356)." Lenin 
scoffed at this sentiment and charged that the "seeker'S" were 
merely wandering aimlessly in a mire of antiquated bourgeois 
philosophies. 
Lenin regarded Lunacharsky as one of the most 
dangerous Bolshevik heretics due to his efforts to supplement 
Marxist doctrine with a spiritual emphasis involving a 
religion of humanity. Lunacharsky hoped to establish an 
"atheistic religion" which would hold the "higher human 
potentialiti;9s" (or the "Higher Self") as the object of 
worship. Lenin rejected Lunacharsky's "god-building" 
philosophy as merely a misguided attempt to replace traditional 
religious superstitions with another. In his view, 
lunacharsky's theories were diametrically opposed to the 
entire materialist tradition and were completely alien to the 
Marxian heritage. In line with this, Lenin claimed that 
-36 
!unac:harsky's philosophy represented an abrupt deviat.ion from 
the work of Marx, Engels, and Feuerbach. whom Lenin considered 
to be the greatest of the pre-Marxian materialists. 
Lenir was actually mistaken on this point. 
Lunacharsky's att.empt. to incorporate spiritual values into 
materialist philosophy was not unprecedented, but was actually 
quite similiar to Feuerbach's attempt to rid humanity of its 
"religious alienation" by establishing man as deity. Although 
Feuerbach did not actually advocate the organized worship of 
humanity, both he and Lunacharsky sought to establish a 
religion of humanity which would reject the existence of any 
supernatural being as an affront to the dignity of man. 
Whi Ie Lenin clear1 y r'egarded Lunachar-sky as t.he 
greatest threat to the uncompromising atheism of Marxist 
doctrine. he viewed the entire empirio-criticist aproach to 
philosophy as quasi-religious and frequently denounced the 
ŤŲŪŮÙŲÙŬĤȘŲĤJÙĦWĒŸȘÙVWVĚ as "Scholastics." By way of histor'ical 
allusion, Lenin implied that the empirio-criticists were 
following in the footsteps of St. Thomas Aquinas, who sought 
to create a "grand synthesis" of christian theology and 
aristotelean philosophy in an effort to provide a rational 
foundation for the christian faith. The precise meaning of this 
accusation is somewhat ambiguous, although there are a number of 
possible interpretations. 
Lenin probably recognized the distinction that whereas 
Aquinas had sought to strengthen a religious doctrine by setting 
it upon a rational foundation. the empirio-criticists had (in 
his view) actually set out to weaken Marxist doctrine by 
introducing articles of faith into a sound and "scientific" body 
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of thought. An alternate explanation which, in light of Lenin's 
disposition. is probably more plausible, is that he believed that 
empirio-criticism represented an attempt on the part of bourgeois 
philosophical and theological authorities to grant legitimacy to 
their doomed beliefs by cloaking them in the garb of Marxism. 
while at the same time weakening the genuine article. In effect. 
Lenin may have been suggesting that the class enemy had come to 
understand the bankruptcy of its belief systems and had been 
forced to tacitly recognize this by allying itself with the very 
philosophy which guaranteed its ultimate downfall, but only in 
order to corrupt it and thereby stem the tide of history_ While 
this hypothesis clearly involves some conjecture, Lenin certainly 
viewed empirio-criticism not only as an aberration, but also as a 
conspiracy. although the extent of this belief is difficult to 
guage since it is never fully developed in ÓŸWĹŲÙŠŨÙVÜĚ@nd 
NÜŌÙŲWŌŸĿŲJÙWĚic:i?m. 
Of course, on a more superficial level Lenin's 
identification of empirio-criticism with Scholasticism may 
represent a procedural as opposed to an ideological criticism. 
like Aquinas, the empirio-criticists were attempting to effect a 
"grand synthesis" which would ŅŸŤVẀŨĚtin the creation of a body of 
knowledge of almost universal scope and significance. Lenin 
resented these efforts and objected to the eclecticism of his 
philosophical opponents. Whatever the case, Lenin certainly 
regarded religious beliefs and practices as anathema to Marxist 
doctrine and vigorously sought to eliminate them even before they 
had gained any significant following in the party. 
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The empirio-criticists sought to reinforce Marx's 
interpretation of history with a discussion of sociological 
and biological factors which they believed helped to explain 
the nature of society as well as the origins and implications 
of social change. The empirio-criticists attempted to describe 
the underlying social energetics and biological aspects of 
social development within a Marxist framework. In making such 
attempts. it may be said that the empirio-criticists treated 
Marxian doctrine more as a social theory in the making than as 
established dogma_ Indeed. the empirio-criticists made an 
effort to enrich the Marxian view of historical development 
with elaborate sociological and biological concepts which were 
absent in ȘŨŸVÙȘŠŨĚMarxism. 
lenin conceded that the empirio-criticists had acted 
with good intentions in trying to extend the legitimacy of 
historical materialism, but he complained that they had ignored 
the primacy of economic conditions -- the core concept of Marx's 
historical teachings -- and had consequently failed to 
appreciate the true significance of Marx's contribution to 
the IJnderstanding of historical change_ Lenin clearly regarded 
concrete economic analysis as the cornerstone of the marxist 
approach to the study of social development and he chided the 
empirio-criticists for abandoning this legacy in favor of an 
approach which contained "not a gr-ain of Mar-xism (338)." 
There is not a shadow of concrete economic enquiry 
(sic) here, not a hint of the Marxian method. the 
method of dialectics and the world outlook of 
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ma.t.erialism, ordy a lfIere invent.ion of defnitions 
and attempts to fit them into the ready-made 
conclusions of Marxism (339). 
Besides the issue of orthodoxy. Lenin may have had 
other reasons to oppose the attempts of the empirio-criticists 
to provide Marxian doctrine with sociological and biological 
dimensions. The basic issue at hand in this controversy may 
have been the weakening of the traditional Marxist doctrine of 
economic determinism. 
In the main. Marxist theory rests on the assumption 
that all social phenomena are determined by immutable laws of 
historical development which are rooted in underlying economic 
realities. It is claimed that economic factors constitute the 
only source of significant. historical change and are responsible 
for the whole of human development from primitive times to the 
present. The empirio-criticists sought. t.o expand upon this 
traditional formulation of historical materialism by identifying 
other aspects of historical change rooted in biological factors 
and social energetics. In their view. such an approach to the 
Marxist interpretation of history provided a greater depth to the 
doctrine and offered a more complete treatment of the lessons of 
history than was to be found in the works of the classical 
theorists. 
From Lenin's perspective. such a contention may have 
seemed ominous in that the empirio-criticists were suggesting 
that economic progress is not the sole historical determinant. 
He may have felt that the empirio-criticists were working to 
the detriment of Marx's economic model while at the same time 
complicating the system beyond usefullness with their 
.-
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biological and sorio]ogical theories of historical change. 
Lenin may have feared that if such suggestions came to be taken 
seriously. the economic trigger of historical progress would be 
obscured and the primary source of social advance would be 
reduced to the status of a contributing factor. 
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Social Being and Social ĿŬŪŸȘÙŬẀVŪŤVVĚ
The empirio-criticist Alexander Bogdanov questioned 
the traditional Marxist stance concerning the primacy of 
social being over social consciousness and contended that 
these forms of social existence were actually identical to 
each other. Bogdanov reasoned that in order for human beings 
to establish a social order in which they may become social 
beings. it was first necessary for them to consciously 
interact with each other so that they could jointly establish 
some sort of community. Social being. he argued, could not 
exist prior to social consciousness due to the fact that 
neither social being nor social consciousness could exist 
independently of the other. In fact, it may be said that 
Bogdanov regarded these concepts as little more than different 
aspects of a single phenomenon. 
Lenin dismissed Bogdanov's identity theory as an 
idealist misconception which was not only alien to and 
incompatible with -- Marxism. but was also clearly untenable 
in light of ordinary observations. Lenin accused Bogdanov of 
placing an exagerated emphasis on the world of the mind in his 
empirio-monist philosophy and claimed that he had 
underestimated the necessary role of material prerequisites In 
the formation of social consciousness. 
According to Lenin, the assertion that being 
determines consciousness is the sina qua non of all 
materialist philosophy and especially of historical 
materialism. Tn denying this maxim, Bogdanov had undermined 
the materialist foundations of the Marxist approach to social 
42 
consciousness lenin acknowledged that Bogdanov had intended 
to corroborate the validity of historical materialism in his 
inquiry. but argued that Bogdanov's approach was unjustified 
by the tenents of true Marxism and that his conclusions 
unwittingly served the class enemy_ 
Materialism in general recognises (sic) objectively 
real being (matter) as independent of the 
consciousness, sensation, experience, etc., of 
humanity. Historical materialism recognises (sic) 
social being as independent of the social 
consciousness of humanity. In both cases consciousness 
is only the reflection of being, at best an 
approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) 
reflection of it. From this Marxian philosophy, which 
is cast from a single piece of steel, you cannot 
eliminate one basic premise, one essential part, 
without departing from objective truth, without 
falling prey to a bourgeois-reactionary falsehood 
(337-338) . 
Lenin acknowledged that on the whole Bogdanov accepted 
Marx's interpretation of history, but charged that at the same 
time he had ignored several of the crucial underpinnings of 
Marxian theory and had attempted to replace them with idealist 
notions. Lenin characterized Bogdanov's social philosophy 
as materialist above and idealist below. He criticized 
Bogdanov's efforts to prove the correctness of historical 
materialism with "idealist" postulates as a futile and 
misguided attempt to improve upon a doctrine which was in no 
need of revision. Finally, Lenin objected to Bogdanov's 
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identity theory. which he saw as an unpardonable break with 
orthodox Marxism. 
Lenin regarded social consciousness as a phenomenon 
completely rooted in. and determined by, the underlying 
material, that is, economic, foundations of society_ In his 
opinion, social consciousness consisted of an accurate, 
although often incomplete. reflection of social being in the 
human mind. Lenin argued that although the conscious 
interaction of people was a necessary precondition of all 
social organization, this did not mean that social 
consciousness and social existence are identical. He 
maintained that human behavior is strongly influenced by 
objective economic laws which exist independently of man's 
knowledge of them. Although human behavior is ultimately 
determined by the complex web of economic interrelationships 
which forms the basis of society and constitutes social 
existence. the individual is usually unaware of the economic 
factors ŴUÙȘŸĚdetermine his actions and of the possible 
aggregate effects of economic behaviors on the nature of 
social being. 
Lenin admitted that. due to its complexity. the total 
economic activity of any society had largely been beyond the 
grasp of human knowledge in past ages, but he argued that this 
was no longer the case since Marx and Engels had discovered 
the principal economic laws which govern historical change. 
Furthermore, he proclaimed that through Marxism mankind had 
aquired the capacity to effect desirable changes in the human 
condition. According to L.enin, the primary goal of mankind 
(greatly facilitated by the work of Marx and Engels) is to 
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comprehend the moving principles of historical change so that 
man may adapt his social consciousness to those laws and 
become the maker of history_ 
The fact that you live and conduct your business, beget 
children, produce products and exchange them, gives rise 
to an objectively necessary chain of events, a chain of 
development, which is independent of your social 
consciousness. and is never grasped by the latter 
completely. The highest task of humanity is to comprehend 
the objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution 
of social life) in its general and fundamental 
features. so that it may be possible to adapt to it 
one's social consciousness and the consciousness of 
the advanced classes of all capitalist countries in 
as definite, clear, and critical a fashion as 
possible (337). 
Historical materialism has. of course, been subjected 
to a number of criticisms since it was first formulated by 
Marx_ For instance, it has been argued that the economic 
foundation of society, which occupies a place of primacy in 
Marx's social theory, is actually a system of subjective 
categories which includes, besides the mode and relations of 
production. such preconditions of the means and forces of 
production as education, culture, technology, and politics 
phenomena which, according to Marxist theory. are determined 
by economic circumstances. 
The main thesis of historical materialism is its 
assertion that all social change results from changes in the 
economic substructure of society_ Critics point out that even if 
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this interpretation is valid, the question of the ultimate cause 
of historical change -- the trigger of the trigger -- is still 
left unanswered. A similiar criticism centers around the 
contention that science and technology -- both superstructural 
phenomena -- may initiate change in the substructure, 
challenging the notion of economic primacy. 
An additional problem with the Marxist interpretation 
of history arises in connection with the assumption that an 
understanding of economic causations will provide all that is 
needed to accurately predict and eventually manipulate 
historical devel6pment. fven if it were conceded that the 
primary causes of historical change are economic, it does not 
follow that an understanding of these factors would guarantee 
knowledge of the future COIJrse of historical development (or 
control of that development) any more than an understading of 
the causes of foul weather would enable man to eradicate 
tornadoes. 
Perhaps the most significant criticism of historical 
materialism stems from the fact that this theory is hard 
pressed to explain its relationship to reality within its own 
framework. If social consciousness is in fact under all 
circumstances merely a semi-accurate reflection of social 
being, then it stands to reason that a socialist consciousness 
could not have arisen within a society dominated by the 
capitalist mode of production. It may be said that in 
formulating his theory of historical materialism, Marx 
simultaneously transcended the bounds of this system and set 
himself at odds with his own interpretation of history_ 
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Kantianism: Left and Right Criticism 
Both Lenin and the empirio-criticists regarded Kantianism 
as an inconsistent and contradictory system of thought whose 
validity was open to question_ Lenin acknowledged that both the 
materialists and the empirio-criticists disputed the validity of 
Kantian philosophy, but he argued that they did so on opposite 
grounds, from hostile orientations, and for cross purposes. He 
claimed that whereas the materialists criticized Kant from the 
left, the empirio-criticists sided with the idealists and 
criticized him from the right. 
In Lenin's view, Kant's philosophy represented an attempt 
to consolidate idealist and materialist postUlates within a 
single body of thought and was, as a result, neither strictly 
materialist or idealist in nature. Accordingly, he argued, 
Kantianism had been subjected to criticisms and revisions from 
both the idealists (whom he characterized as philosophers of the 
right) and the materialists (whom he characterized as 
philosophers of the left). 
The principal feature of Kant's philosophy is the 
reconciliation of materialism with idealism, a compromise 
between the two, the combination within one system of 
heterogeneous and contrary philosophical trends. When 
Kant assumes that something outside us, a thing-in-
itself, corresponds to our ideas, he is a materialist. 
When he declares the thing-In-itself to be unknowable, 
transcendental, other-sided, he is an idealist. _.The 
materialists blamed Kant for his idealism, rejected the 
idealist features of his system, demonstrated the 
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knowability. the this-sidedness of the thing-in-itself. 
[and] the absence of a fundamental difference between the 
thing-in-itself and the phenomenon._. The agnostics and 
idealists blamed Kant for his assumption of the thing-in-
itself as a concession to mater-ialism. "realism." or-
naive realism (200)," 
In Lenin's opinion. the empirio-criticists had rejected 
the materialist aspects of Kantianism and had embraced and 
embellished its idealist postulates in their philosophy. In line 
with this, he charged that the empirio-criticists had addressed 
the shortcomings of Kantianism in an idealist manner and had 
repudiated the only progressive (that is, materialist) aspects of 
Kant's philosophy. Consequently. he argued, empirio-criticism 
represented a return to outmoded idealist and agnostic thinking 
which stood in sharp contrast to the development of materialist 
philosophy_ 
Thus the entire school of Feuerbach. Marx and Engels 
turned from Kant to the left, to a complete rejection of 
all idealism and of all agnosticism. But our Machians 
followed the reactionary trend in philosophy. Mach and 
Avenerius, who criticized Kant from the standpoint of 
Hume and Berkeley (207). 
lenin opposed the empirio-criticists not only because he 
deemed their teachings reactionary, but more importantly because 
he resented that they had (quite successfully) carried out what 
he considered a blatant heresy under the banner of Marxism. In 
Lenin's view, the empirio-criticists constituted a clear threat 
to the integrity and inviolability of classical Marxist 
philosophy due to the fact that their revisionist activities were 
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conducted under the guise of further developing the Marxian 
system of thought. He also charged that the empirio-criticists 
sought to obscure their idealist dispositions with the use of 
"new" and confusing terminologies. For Lenin. not only was 
empirio-criticism a wolf in sheep's clothing; it was also a 
cancer eating away at the heart of Marxism which had to be 
eradicated in the interest of human progress. Lenin criticized 
the Marxist -- particularly the Bolshevik -- empirio-criticists 
far more harshly and thoroughly than the non-Marxist ones because 
in his thinking the outspoken enemy was a lesser threat than the 
deviating friend. 
Of course. it is the sacred right of every citizen. and 
particularly of every intellectual. to follow any 
ideological reactionary he likes. But when people who 
have radically severed relations with the very 
foundations of Marxism in philosophy begin to dodge, 
confuse matters, hedge, and assure us that t.hey "too" are 
ŸÍŠŲẄÙVWVĚ in philosophy. that they are "almost" in 
agreement with Marx. and have only slightly 
"supplemented" him --- the spectacle is a far fr'om 
pleasent one (207). 
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Parties in Philosophy 
The empirio-criticists claimed that they had transcended 
the bounds of classical thinking in their work and contended that 
their system offered a method of explaining natural and social 
processes which was untainted by either materialist or idealist 
dogmas. Lenin rejected these claims and argued that the empirio-
criticists' futile attempt to steer a neutral course in 
philosophy had only led them to confusion and uncertainty. He 
charged that the empirio-criticists had failed to properly 
understand their role as Marxists in the struggle between 
materialism and idealism and had consequently landed themselves 
in the idealist camp. 
According to Lenin, a philosopher could neither take a 
neutral stance on the issue of primacy nor declare his work to be 
above the struggle between materialism and idealism due to the 
fact that all philosophy is actually a framework for this dispute 
and is therefore inseparable from it. Lenin censured the empirio-
criticists for suggesting that the issue of primacy -- which, he 
claimed, had been at the center of philosophical debate for 
thousands of years-- had been t'endered "obsolete" by modern 
philosophy_ Furthermore, he characterized the empirio-criticists' 
claim of non-partisanship in philosophy as a betrayal of the 
Marxian legacy_ In his view, the empirio-criticists had abandoned 
the Marxist approach in their effort to combine two hostile 
philosophies into a single system of thought. In short, Lenin 
charged that the empirio-criticists had foresaken partisanship 
for a bland consensus. 
According to Lenin. the true significance of Marx's work 
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had been lost on the empirio-criticists, who wrongly looked to 
contemporary academic philosophy for answers to philosophical 
problems which had, in his opinion, already been solved for all 
time in the works of Marx and Engels. What the empirio-criticists 
and the philosophical scholars described as "narrowness" or "one-
sidedeness" in Marx's uncompromising materialism was actually 
evidence of his understanding of the partisan nature of 
philosophy. In order for Marxism to be true to itself, Lenin 
claimed, it must be thoroughly partisan. Marx. he continued, had 
recognized this and had always sought to advance materialist 
philosophy while defending it against the challenges of idealism, 
agnosticism. and various other lesser systems. 
The genius of Marx and Engels consisted in the very fact 
that in the course of a long period, nearly half a 
century. they developed materialism, that they further 
advanced one fundamental trend in philosophy, that they 
did not confine themselves to reiterating epistemological 
problems that had already been solved, but consistently 
applied, and showed how to apply -- this same 
materialism in the sphere of the social sciences, 
mercilessly brushing aside as litter and rubish the 
pretentious rigmarole. the innumerable attempts to 
"discover" a "new" line in philosophy, to invent a "new 
trend and so forth (348-349). 
Lenin's remarks in this matter are illuminating in that 
they reveal his tendency to closely identify himself with Marx 
and Engels so as to present himself as their most ardent disciple 
and, perhaps. their most qualified successor. Whether Lenin 
cloaked himself in the garb of orthodoxy in a calculated effort 
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to establish himself as an authority or out of genuine devotion 
to the ideology is an open question. but it may be said that the 
passion and conviction of Lenin's writings suggests a degree of 
earnestness which surpasses the requirements of political 
pragmatism. In short. one gets the impression upon reading Lenin 
that he was indeed a true believer. In any case. Lenin insisted 
that in condemning the empirio-criticists, he was following in 
the footsteps of Marx and Engels. 
Marx and Engels were partisans in philosophy from start 
to finish; they were able to detect the deviations from 
materialism and the concessions to idealism and fideism 
in each and every "new" tendency (352). 
Lenin censured the empi rio-cri ticists for dr'awing on 
"bourgeois" philosophies in thei r effot't to develop Marxism. In 
his opinion. the empirio-criticists had naively placed their 
trust in the work of academic philosophers, whom he described as 
agents of the ruling class. Apparently, lenin viewed the 
philosophy of Mach and Avenerius as a clever trap with which the 
ruling class had hoped to obscure the central issues of 
philosophy. The empirio-criticists, he alleged, had fallen victim 
to a grand deception and had become the pawns of the bourgeoisie 
1n its strugle against materialism. 
for Lenin, philosophy was not a mere excercise in 
contemplation. nor was it the exclusive domain of intellectual 
elites; it was yet another arena in which the life and death 
struggle between the working class and its capitalist oppressors 
was being waged. For lenin, the conquest of philosophy was as 
important to the success of the communist revolution as was the 
expropriation of the means of production. Indeed, Lenin was 
shrewd to recognize that in order for a revolution to succeed, it 
must capture not only the property and power structure of its 
enemies. but also the hearts and minds of its subjects. When 
viewed jn this light, Materialism and NÜŮÙŲÙŬĤĿŲÙWÙŸÙVÜĚmay be 
seen as an important facet of Lenin's ultimate drive to power. 
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